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The traditional assumption in the accounting literature is that regulatory agencies 
such as the SEC investigate firms that are most likely to violate regulations and enforce 
firms’ compliance with these regulations. However, economists have long argued that 
regulators can be captured by the industry they are supposed to regulate or can be 
influenced by the government (Stigler 1971). Next to economic theories, recent fraud 
scandals have further increased public concerns that regulators are not effective in their 
enforcement of regulations.  
This dissertation investigates underlying motives for differences in regulatory 
scrutiny across different types of firms operating in different institutional settings. As 
regulatory behavior also affects managers’ manipulation choices, this dissertation also 
sheds light on how managers make different manipulation choices depending on the 
regulatory scrutiny they face.  
In particular, chapter 2 and 3 investigate the behavior of regulators in the 
healthcare industry and hospital managers’ reactions to these behaviors, while chapter 4 
focuses on regulatory preferences of the SEC and managers’ reactions to these 
preferences. All of these studies contribute towards a better understanding of regulatory 
behavior and firms’ reactions to such behavior. This chapter provides a summary of the 
findings of each study, their limitations as well as their contributions and implications. 
An outlook on potential future research concludes this dissertation.  
4.6.  Summary 
The first study of this dissertation, presented in chapter 2, empirically investigates 
whether regulators in the healthcare sector are less likely to enforce regulations for 
nonprofit firms that have higher performance on social goals. It further examines 
whether these organizations, in light of this lower regulatory enforcement, use upcoding 
as a tool to subsidize their social goals.  
Based on “regulatory capture” theory (Stigler 1971), this study develops the case 
that differences in regulatory scrutiny may serve the benefit of a larger group of 
stakeholders and might reflect regulators’ preferences about how to maximize social 
welfare. Nonprofit firms’ objective is not only to meet a zero-profit goal, but also to 
improve the welfare of a broad group of constituents (Hoerger 1991; Newhouse 1970; 
Pauly 1987). In the healthcare sector nonprofit hospitals, for instance, pursue social 
goals such as providing medical education and care to the uninsured (Clement et al. 
1994). As the financial support nonprofits obtain to pursue these social goals is limited 
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(Chen et al. 2009), nonprofit hospitals are likely to explore alternative mechanisms to 
generate additional resources. One such mechanism to supplement the cost of pursuing 
social goals is upcoding, a form of overbilling where an ailment is classified as more 
severe than it actually is.  
In line with this argumentation, it is posited that health care regulators recognize 
that nonprofit hospitals pursue costly social goals, which are implicitly supported by 
regulators’ reduced enforcement of firms with higher social performance as such 
reduced enforcement allows these firms to obtain higher average prices. As such 
preferences can be revealed in the process of regulatory enforcement, it is argued that 
nonprofit hospital managers that pursue social goals react to this differentiated 
enforcement of regulation by engaging in higher levels of upcoding. The results confirm 
the predictions developed in this study, showing that hospitals with higher performance 
on social goals are less likely to be convicted for upcoding and use upcoding to 
subsidize the cost of social objectives such as charity care and medical education.  
The second study of this dissertation investigates the role of upcoding as a type of 
revenue manipulation in firms’ performance management activities. This study builds 
on the first study of this dissertation, in which revenue manipulation via upcoding has 
been identified as a powerful manipulation tool, which allows firms to increase 
revenues without (1) altering operations, (2) affecting costs directly or (3) facing the 
need to reverse in the future. More precisely, the second study examines how managers 
make trade-off decisions between revenue manipulation and accrual-based earnings 
management and real activities manipulation.  
Whereas studies have started to examine how firms make choices between AEM 
and RAM depending on the costs associated with these strategies (Zang 2012; 
Badertscher 2011), the role of revenue manipulation via overbilling practices in such 
manipulation choices has not yet been investigated. As fraud scandals suggest that 
firms’ performance manipulation tools are not limited to AEM and RAM, studying the 
trade-off decisions between these three manipulation tools provides a more complete 
picture of managers’ manipulation choices.  
In addition, this study identifies operational and financial circumstances as well as 
scrutiny from different regulators that make the application of each of these three 
strategies costly. Therefore, it is likely that managers will trade off between these three 
different strategies depending on the specific constraints they are facing.  
The results of the second study confirm that managers trade off between these 
three activities, indicating that the use of RM as an alternative manipulation tool directly 
decreases the hospital’s need to apply RAM and AEM. In addition, the results suggest 
that the trade-off decisions are driven by the operational constraints the hospital is 
facing. Overall, the results suggest that organizations that have the opportunity to 
engage in revenue manipulation are likely to make different trade-off decisions in their 
performance manipulation choices than organizations that have only RAM and AEM at 
their disposal.  
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The third study of this dissertation extends the analysis of regulatory behavior 
from the healthcare sector to a large sample of listed firms and focuses on the role of 
government in affecting the behavior of regulatory agencies. In particular, it investigates 
whether government’s preferences for firms that contribute to the government’s policy 
of fostering employment are likely to reflect in the SEC’s decisions as to which firms to 
investigate. Thus, this study examines the role that government has on inducing 
pressure on the enforcement actions of the SEC, as one specific regulatory agency, and 
also provides insights in how firms that are subject to such preferential treatment adjust 
their reporting behavior.  
Even though research in accounting and finance traditionally assumes that the SEC 
is a neutral regulatory agency that investigates those firms that are most likely to violate 
GAAP, economists such as Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have long argued that 
regulations and regulators are influenced by the government. To maximize political 
support the government responds to both constituent and special interest pressure by 
adjusting its political decisions and measures accordingly (Stigler 1971). As the 
employment conditions are proven to systematically affect future electoral outcomes 
(Hibbs 2006), the government pursues a policy of promoting these conditions by 
supporting not only large employers in absolute terms, but also smaller, labor-intense 
firms that contribute to future employment (Adams and Brock 1987b; Audretsch 2003; 
Caves 1976).  
The reason for government’s pressure on SEC’s enforcement actions is that these 
enforcement actions can take down firms that are important for the government’s policy 
of promoting employment. As a consequence, the SEC and its Commissioners are likely 
to face political pressure from the government to spare labor-intense firms from 
enforcement actions. The government has several measures such as decision rights over 
the SEC’s budget and the nomination of SEC Commissioners at its disposal to impose 
its preferences on the SEC’s decisions as to which firms to investigate. As a result, the 
SEC is likely to act in accordance with government’s policy to foster employment and 
thus exercises judgment as to which firms to investigate. 
In line with this argumentation, the results provide evidence that labor-intense 
firms are less likely to be subject to SEC’s enforcement actions. To test the robustness 
of these results, the study further examines whether a government’s higher sensitivity to 
constituents’ interests in election years further decreases the likelihood of enforcement 
actions against labor-intense firms. The results confirm this hypothesis providing further 
evidence that government’s preferences for firms that support government’s policies 
reflect directly in SEC’s enforcement actions. All of these results hold after controlling 
for firms’ accounting quality and two alternative explanations for firms’ favorable 
treatment by the SEC, i.e., firms’ location and lobbying activities. In addition, the study 
also provides evidence that labor-intense firms do not have a higher accounting quality, 
which would explain fewer SEC investigations and convictions. Instead, the results 
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indicate that labor-intense firms exploit this preferential treatment by the SEC by 
engaging in more aggressive accounting choices.  
4.7.  Limitations 
Even though considerable attention has been devoted to the empirical research 
design in each of the three studies, several limitations apply. As the studies presented in 
chapter 2 and 3 both investigate upcoding in the healthcare sector, they have some 
limitations in common. First, in both studies a hospital’s upcoding level is investigated 
using only one respectively three DRG families. Including more DRG families in these 
analyses would indeed provide more complete results, but will greatly increase the 
complexity of the analyses because interactions between these DRG families have to be 
accounted for. In addition, to the extent that all DRG families used in these analyses are 
known for being prone to upcoding for over a decade, the analyses provide a 
conservative proxy for a hospital’s upcoding behavior. An additional concern is related 
to the measurement of upcoding or inappropriate billing. To determine upcoding, two 
measures are used to control for the patient health status, i.e., Charlson index and 
mortality rate, which control for the underlying patient characteristics. However, even 
after controlling for these underlying patient characteristics, it cannot be conclusively 
stated that every case where there is a higher proportion of DRGs in the top of the DRG 
family is indeed upcoding. Finally, the analyses focus only on hospitals located in 
California. However, the results should be generalizable to other countries that use 
DRG-type reimbursement systems such as Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. 
In addition to the limitations already mentioned, the study presented in chapter 3 is 
subject to additional limitations. First, the possibility to manipulate revenues as 
described in this study might not be a feasible manipulation strategy for all types of 
firms. However, fraud scandals in various industries suggest that many firms have the 
possibility to manipulate revenues via overbilling, which is a similar mechanism as 
upcoding (Koppel 2006). Second, the study focuses only on upcoding as an alternative 
manipulation strategy of hospitals and ignores additional potential manipulation 
mechanism such as kickbacks or overtreatment of patients (GAO 2000). Finally, the 
analysis focuses on for-profit hospitals whose operations and related manipulation 
incentives might differ to firms in other industries. However, prior research indicates 
that for-profit hospitals face similar manipulation incentives than firms in other 
industries.  
The third study also has several limitations. First, AAERs only represent the end 
product of SEC’s enforcement actions as opposed to the initial investigations 
themselves. Thus, the analyses cannot directly test at which stages of the SEC 
enforcement process government’s preferences affect the enforcement process. 
However, as the study also finds that labor-intense firms are less likely to receive a 
comment letter, which is an important trigger event for an enforcement action, the study 
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can provide some evidence that the resource-constrained SEC allocates fewer resources 
to general reviews of firms that contribute to government’s policies. Second, the study 
ignores that also the terms of SEC Commissioners are limited to five years and thus 
SEC Commissioners themselves might have incentives to impact the enforcement 
preferences of the SEC around the end of their terms. Finally, the measures of 
accounting quality have limitations. For instance, it can be argued that higher 
discretionary accruals do not reflect fraudulent misstatements that might eventually lead 
to an AAER, but simply an exploitation of leeway in accounting standards. However, 
given the consistency of the results across several noisy accounting quality measures, 
the study provides some evidence that labor-intense firms have on average a lower 
accounting quality than their less labor-intense peers. 
4.8.  Contributions, Implications and Future Research 
All three studies contribute to the accounting literature as well as have 
implications for firms’ managers, shareholders, policy makers and other stakeholders 
such as regulatory agencies or financial market intermediaries. In particular, the first 
study contributes to the accounting literature as it enhances the understanding of the 
complex social considerations surrounding regulation and its enforcement by showing 
that regulators reduce their enforcement for firms that perform activities that increase 
societal welfare. Accounting literature has not yet examined whether social preferences 
of the regulator drive enforcement efforts. Second, it provides evidence that in nonprofit 
settings, revenue manipulation via upcoding could be driven by a desire to cross-
subsidize social goals. Finally, upcoding has been identified as a powerful method for 
revenue manipulation. The study further has policy implications as it suggests that 
regulators are likely to take the motives for financial manipulation into consideration 
while making decisions about which firms to pursue. In addition, the results identify 
upcoding as one potential reason for the high costs of health care in the US relative to 
other countries.  
One of the main contributions of the second study is that it provides a more 
complete picture of the types of performance management tools that firms use to 
manipulate their performance. This is important to get to more definitive conclusions 
about the application and effect of the various performance management strategies 
(Fields et al. 2001). As it also provides additional insights on the costs that determine 
managers’ decisions to choose one of the three performance manipulation tools over the 
other, it helps to further understand which manipulation strategy firms choose 
depending on their operational environment.  
The findings of this study also inform regulators, auditors and investors that they 
should be aware of alternative, powerful instruments to manipulate financial 
performance, which can hardly be detected from financial reporting numbers. Especially 
for auditors of hospitals’ financial statements the findings of the study suggest that it 
might be important to incorporate the potential performance manipulation resulting 
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from upcoding into their auditing processes in order to conduct a more thorough 
analysis of the hospitals’ reported figures. This study also provides a set of conditions 
that auditors of medical claims should incorporate in their assessment of which 
hospitals to investigate and can thus contribute to improve the detection of upcoding.  
The third study contributes to a growing body of research (Correia 2009; Kedia 
and Rajgopal 2011; Yu and Yu 2011) which shows that the SEC is not neutral in its 
enforcement actions. In addition to prior studies which either focused on firms’ active 
attempts to impact SEC’s enforcement actions via lobbying and political connections or 
on the underlying resource constraints of the SEC, the findings of this study suggest that 
SEC’s enforcement actions are systematically influenced by government’s preferences 
independent of these alternative explanations. Finally, the study provides evidence that 
firms adjust their accounting choices as a result of the preferential treatment by the 
SEC. Thus, these findings inform regulators such as the SEC about potential adverse 
effects of their preferential treatment.  
This dissertation provides a multitude of research possibilities to further improve 
the understanding of the interplay between regulatory behavior and firms’ manipulation 
choices. 
The first study of this dissertation provides evidence that social preferences of the 
regulator drive enforcement efforts. It would be fruitful to explore this issue in other 
industries. For example, research could explore whether firms that signal the importance 
of non-monetary goals such as environmental sustainability or employee learning obtain 
some leniency from regulators such as tax authorities. Future studies could also 
investigate whether firms can actually mislead regulatory agencies about their social 
behavior to reduce regulatory scrutiny. From a social welfare perspective, it would also 
be helpful to investigate whether upcoding to meet the cost of providing indigent people 
with health care or providing medical education is actually preferable.  
Recently, the US healthcare systems has been subject to a significant regulatory 
overhaul stemming from the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). As one of the 
main goals of the ACA is to lower the number of uninsured by expanding public and 
private insurance coverage, future studies could investigate how that regulatory change 
affects hospitals need to apply upcoding to cross-subsidize social goals.75 In addition, 
future studies could shed more light on potentially competing incentives of the regulator 
such as social preferences versus preferences for promotion, which could potentially be 
achieved with a strong enforcement track record.  
The second study provides evidence that upcoding is a powerful manipulation tool 
that decreases the need to apply RAM and AEM. However, to the extent that more and 
more resources are devoted to detect upcoding, future studies could investigate how 
                                                          
75 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the legislation will reduce the number of uninsured 
residents by about 30 million, still leaving over 20 million residents uninsured (CBO 2012).   
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these efforts affect hospitals’ trade-off decisions. In addition, overbilling as a 
mechanism to manipulate revenues is likely to be present in several other industries. It 
would thus be interesting to investigate whether the findings are generalizable to other 
industries in which such possibility to manage revenues exists.   
The findings of the third study suggest that firms that contribute to government’s 
policy of fostering employment are less likely to be subject to SEC’s enforcement 
actions. Future research could investigate whether the SEC Commissioners whose terms 
are limited to five years might have their own incentives to impact the enforcement 
preferences of the SEC around the end of their terms. As the third study also provides 
evidence that firms that enjoy a preferential treatment have a lower accounting quality, 
several questions arise. First, it would be worthwhile to explore the reaction of 
intermediaries such as auditors to such preferential treatment. For instance, auditors 
might decrease their audit fees as they assess the risk of inspection as lower than for 
other clients or increase their fees as the risk of fraudulent accounting choices increases. 
Second, it would be interesting to explore the career consequences for managers that do 
not exploit the preferential treatment by the SEC. Overall, it would also be helpful to 
understand whether such government capture of the regulatory process actually 
increases or decreases social welfare. Finally, future research could explore other types 
of firms that the government has preferences for and how it affects the work of different 
regulators.  
Overall, many drivers of regulatory preferences and firms’ reactions to such 
preferences are still unknown, providing many opportunities for future research.  
 
 
  

